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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with attempts to manage street vendors in India. Firstly it traces the 
evolution of attempts at management, through guidelines introduced in 2002, to the 2014 Act which is 
legally enforceable. The act has not yet been implemented but the State of Madhya Pradesh has 
implemented its own act which is almost identical. This has been successfully implemented at an 
administrative level but on the ground nothing has changed. It is suggested that this reflects the 
importance of symbolic politics and problems of implementation.  
 
Introduction  
Managing the informal sector is one of the major challenges facing urban and local governments in 
the global South. The aim of this paper is firstly to highlight an innovative case study in this area – 
India’s policy for street vendors – describing the process through which the policy was formulated, 
and considering its implementation experience to date. The paper then discusses the politics of policy 
implementation in India more generally, including the tendency for progressive legislation to have 
regressive outcomes. Finally the paper reflects on the lessons for local government in the global 
South, in terms of managing street vendors and the informal sector.   
This paper is based on an Urban Knowledge Network Asia (UKNA) research fellowship awarded to 
the author, and visit to India facilitated by the Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology 
University (CEPT), Ahmedabad, India between 25 March and 24 April 2014. The core area of the 
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research was defined in the title of the project: Citizenship and informality: examining innovative 
state-led approaches and their impact on urban citizenship. This research was carried out through a 
review of (mainly grey) literature, fieldwork in Ahmedabad and Bhopal, and key informant interviews 
with relevant government officials and NGOs in Delhi, Bhopal and Ahmedabad.1   
In the case of street vendors, India passed innovative policy guidelines in 2004, which were amended 
in 2009, and a national law was passed in March 2014. The distinction between a national guideline 
and a national law is significant in affecting how a policy may be implemented.  This paper aims to 
evaluate the impact of the legislation and also to consider the general case of the relationship between 
municipal government and street vendors. 
The process of policy reform and legislation  
At this stage it is appropriate to describe how the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihoods and 
Regulation of Street Vending) Act 2014 was achieved (Government of India 2014).  Street vending 
has been highlighted as a policy issue in India since a 1985 ruling by the Bombay High Court in the 
case Bombay Hawkers Union v Bombay Municipal Corporation, which sought to legitimise street 
vendors through licensing, and creating hawking and non-hawking zones.  
The ruling supported the vendors’ right to trade and determined that the municipal corporation should 
find space for them to trade. This and subsequent Supreme Court rulings were significant in giving the 
vendors some political legitimacy and rights. In the original dispute in Bombay the municipal 
corporation estimated that there were 75,000 street vendors, while the National Association of Street 
Vendors of India (NASVI) estimated there were around 300,000. This discrepancy between official 
estimates of vendor numbers and those by vendor and civil society organizations is a perennial issue 
and clearly has significant relevance to the number of sites needed for vending.  However the problem 
of the availability of appropriate sites to trade was not addressed by the ruling. To some commentators 
this issue remains the central problem faced by street vendors, especially in urban areas where space 
and land – especially in central locations – has a very high value.  
In 2004 the Indian government drew up guidelines to improve the management of street vending. The 
centrepiece of these guidelines was the idea of Town Vending Committees (TVCs) tasked with 
determining where trading could or could not take place. TVCs were to be a partnership between 
vendors and the relevant municipal government, although their precise composition was unspecified. 
Nevertheless, TVCs were one of the first government attempts to manage street vending, and as such 
                                                             
1 I should like to thank CEPT for hosting me in Ahmedabad, Atanu Chatterjee for help in interviewing in 
Ahmedabad and Richard Slater for general assistance in Bhopal. 
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were an important global innovation. Previous work by the author note a few other examples of local 
mediated processes that have sought to ‘manage’ this sector (Amis 2004). However the main 
weakness of the 2004 policy statement was that it was only a guideline, and there was no process to 
compel state and municipal governments to implement it.  
The result was patchy implementation: in only seven of India’s 28 states, and with varying levels of 
commitment. Of these states, Madhya Pradesh (MP) is one of the most advanced. Some urban areas 
within states have also implemented the policy guidelines, with Bhubaneswar in Odisha highlighted 
as an exemplar (Sinha and Roever 2011).   
The 2004 guidelines were updated in 2009, including modifications to improve implementation 
(Government of India 2009). Subsequent lobbying campaigns then attempted to get legislation passed 
to support street vendors, which could be enforced.  
Street vendors have their own national organisation, the National Association of Street Vendors of 
India (NASVI). Founded in 1998, NASVI acts to create a supportive environment for street vendors, 
lobbies on their behalf, is involved in policy dialogue and seeks to build its capacity as a membership 
organisation. NASVI has been a crucial player in promoting the enabling regulatory framework for 
street vendors.  
After the revised 2009 guidelines were published, the cause of street vendors was taken up by the 
National Advisory Committee, a non-governmental committee set up by Sonia Gandhi which might 
be classified as a grouping of ‘the great and the good’.  This was an ad hoc committee established to 
advise the government on potential areas of concern. The end result of this advisory process was a 
Supreme Court ruling that allowed national government policy to have an input into laws and practice 
at the municipal level – something not previously provided for in the Indian constitution and its 
various schedules of responsibilities.  
India is basically a three-tier federal state. The top tier is the Government of India, sometimes called 
the ‘union’ level. The next tier is composed of 28 states, which operate a federal system, and the third 
tier is the municipal and/or local government. The states have extensive powers and there is a large 
research industry devoted to state comparative analysis, especially on social and economic policy.  
Following the Supreme Court ruling it became possible for the union level to prescribe policies at the 
local government level. In the case of street vendors, it was proposed to pass a law that would 
considerably reinforce the 2004 and 2009 guidelines by providing a legal framework mandating their 
implementation, and overcoming the previous weakness that implementation had been at the 
discretion of individual states. 
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The street vendors’ law was finally ratified as the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihoods and 
Regulation of Street Vending) Act 2014, with the drafting partly supported by the UK’s Department 
for International Development. The drafting process involved extensive dialogue between NASVI and 
the Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation.  At one point in 2013/14 the drafting process 
stalled, and to force progress NASVI organised a hunger strike. When it was finally tabled in 2013/14, 
the Act was passed unanimously by both houses of the India Parliament (Lok Sabha and Raja Sabha). 
The support was political, in that members of both houses realised that this was an issue that directly 
affected their potential support and/or political bases. The 2014 Act was widely seen as a major 
success for NASVI – which after nearly ten years of lobbying was actively involved in drafting the 
legislation – and also as a good example of partnership between government and civil society in 
policy-making.  The Act also represents a potentially significant innovation in mechanisms to regulate 
the informal sector in the global South.    
The key beneficial innovations of the Act are as follows: 
 Codification of the idea of ‘natural markets’ – ie “a market where sellers and buyers have 
traditionally congregated for sale and purchase of products… [which] has been determined 
by the local authority on the recommendations of the Town Vending Development committee” 
(Section 2 (e)). This was an important innovative definition. 
 Measures to ensure balanced membership of Town Vending Committees, which must include 
“members nominated to represent the non-governmental organisations… [and CBOs who] 
shall be not be less than ten per cent” (Section 22 (c)) and “the number representing the street 
vendors shall not be less than forty per cent who shall be elected by the street vendors in such 
manner as may be prescribed” (Section 22 (d)). This means that street vendors or 
stakeholders supportive of them comprise at least 50% of the committee and cannot be “run 
roughshod over by the municipality”.2 This was important in empowering street vendors in 
the process of urban planning and/or politics. 
 The zoning of areas to allow or prohibit vending. This is one of the key areas of the Act, 
widely referred to by government and interested parties as the ‘traffic light system’, although 
the legislation does not use this language.  In this system, red is used for areas where vending 
is prohibited, green for areas where it is fully allowed, and amber for those where vending is 
allowed at certain times (Section 21 and First Schedule, 2 (c)).  
                                                             
2 Personal communication Indian Government official April 2014. 
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The Act also contains provisions to prevent harassment of vendors by the police and other agencies: 
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law… no street vendor who carries on the street 
vending activities in accordance with the terms and conditions of his certificate of vending shall be 
prevented from exercising such rights by any person or police…” (Section 27, Government of India, 
2014).  
In theory Section 27 should give street vendors considerable protection, but commentators note that 
this clause, which effectively overrules provisions elsewhere in the legal system, has not yet been 
challenged and implemented. The extent to which new provisions in India’s legal system are 
implemented is often determined by the results of legal challenges and higher court rulings. As the 
street vendors’ Act is still very new, the results of such potential challenges are as yet unknown.  
In summary, the 2014 Act represents a major attempt to provide a progressive legal solution to the 
‘problem’ of street vendors (and to some extent other sections of the informal sector). It is a unique 
innovation in urban governance within the global South.  However, the key challenge lies in its 
implementation, discussed in the next section. 
Implementation experience 
While it is not yet possible to fully evaluate the 2014 Act, it is possible to assess experience in the 
state of Madhya Pradesh (MP), which effectively has been piloting the 2014 legislation.  As noted 
earlier, MP was the state that most systematically implemented the 2004 and 2009 guidelines and, in 
broad policy terms, the guidelines and the Act are similar. This study found that officials in MP were 
clearly proud they were effectively leading the way in the implementation of the 2014 Act.  
In implementing the guidelines, MP drew up its own legislation, so their current Act is the Madhya 
Pradesh Path Par Vikray Karne Walo Ki Jivika Ka Sanrakshan Aur Vikray Ka Viniyaman Adhiniyam 
2012. At the time of writing, the 2014 Act was only just on the statute book. The only difference 
between the MP legislation and the 2014 Act is the composition of the TVCs, as in MP there is only 
provision for 40% of TVC members to represent street vendor interests, compared to 50% in the 2014 
Act. Nevertheless MP has tried to implement the 2014 Act more seriously and comprehensively than 
any other state in India.  Reasons advanced for this by respondents  were on the one hand the degree 
of institutional autonomy that local government in MP enjoys, and on the other hand the fact that, as a 
poor (or ‘backward’) state, it is sensitive to popular opinion and/or poorer citizens’ votes. 
Views on implementation of the 2014 Act in MP vary. There does exist a systematic process through 
which zones in urban MP, including Bhopal, have been divided into red, amber and green (ie those 
where trading is prohibited, time-bound, or freely allowed). The zoning is in narrative rather than 
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mapped form, using statements such as “next door to the number X bus stop at Y location”. This 
zoning is well documented in Bhopal and across the state. A consultant working in the field noted that 
“they” [the Bhopal local government] had followed the 2012 Act to “the letter of the tee”. It was not 
possible to establish the rationale for definition of the zones, but traffic use appears to have played a 
part. Discussions with Bhopal Municipal Corporation (BMC) indicated that there was no physical 
planning map that showed the zones. 
However, some concerns were voiced that the zoning process was more top-down than the Act 
intends. NIDAM, an NGO in MP that lobbies for the informal sector in general and street vendors in 
particular, and is a local member of NASVI, was one organisation to voice such concerns. The 
representative of NIDAM interviewed for this study had not seen a map of vending zones either, but 
thought that “there might be one”.3 Given that street vendors’ activity often involves spatial planning 
on a micro scale this seems an important concern. It seems strange that, if such a map exists, the 
researcher was not able to access it during discussions with BMC. The lack of a map may also 
indicate that management of street vendors was seen as a general administrative issue rather than a 
planning issue.  This is in contrast to some states, such as Gujurat, where the control of street vendors’ 
activities is part of the process of development control. 
The view of NIDAM and of vendors at the sites visited for this study was somewhat different from 
BMC. First, they were actively involved with working with and sometimes challenging BMC. The 
relatively strong influence of civil society and the various levels of government was highlighted, and 
respondents’ desire for vendors and government representatives – as far as possible – to work together 
was noteworthy. They acknowledged that Bhopal’s urban public spaces had been defined according to 
the three categories of green, amber and red, and they had the same ‘narrative’ planning documents as 
the BMC, but they expressed major concerns about what these meant on the ground.  There was also a 
dispute over the number of street traders in Bhopal, with NIDAM claiming two or three times more 
vendors than the BMC estimate. This mirrored earlier disputes in Mumbai and seems to be a common 
issue in street vending (Shapiro Anjaria 2006). NIDAM also highlighted a dispute with BMC over ID 
cards. NIDAM was lobbying for licences, which have a stronger legal backing, but BMC was issuing 
ID cards instead. NIDAM also claimed that of the 5,000 licences issued, 1,500 went to individuals 
who were not street vendors but were connected to BMC through patronage networks. It was not clear 
what the advantage of a licence would be, but the licence was seen a potential opportunity for those 
who could obtain one. 
                                                             
3 It was suggested to me at a workshop at DPU, University College London in October 2015 that this ambiguity 
might be intentional and gives a degree of flexibility for political purposes. 
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The first complaint about the ‘traffic light’ zoning was that the green zones often did not exist, or 
were in unsuitable locations, either because there was insufficient footfall to create a market, or 
because the environmental conditions were unsuitable for trading. Of the 46 locations zoned green in 
the BMC survey, the vendors claimed that only four were acceptable. After a more detailed discussion 
– covering every listed site – it appeared that about 30 sites were suitable for trading. The 
unsuitability of designated trading zones is a frequent complaint in the street vending debate in India 
(Bhowmik 2003, p. 1544). 
An even more illuminating discussion concerned the red zones (where trading was prohibited).  At 
one point the NIDAM official commented that vendors were “trading in all the red zones”. The 
researcher was urged to visit a site “100 metres from BMC HQ where approximately 100 vendors are 
actively working or trading”. It was strongly suggested that vendors could trade with impunity when 
they or their representatives had “political connections”, suggesting that despite the impressive legal 
framework, patronage politics was still very much alive. Indeed, at these sites vendors were expected 
to pay 10–20 Rupees a day to the council. Although the precise legal status of this payment was 
unclear, it appeared to be accepted as a common or expedient practice. Intriguingly, the impression 
from the interviews was that the amber zone was the one most successfully and meaningfully 
implemented, possibly because it is the least politically problematic. 
Evictions were also seen as problematic. It appeared that evictions were more likely at the politically 
insignificant geographical edge of the urban area. In addition it was noted that evictions were more 
likely at the end of the financial year when officials sought to meet various ‘targets’ – and probably 
less likely around the time of national or state elections.  
It was interesting to note that NIDAM had been able to use India’s Right to Information Act (the 
equivalent of a Freedom of Information Act) to successfully challenge the fees levied on those trading 
in red zones. They successfully argued that if a vendor should not be trading there, he or she should 
not be paying a fee. The case raises interesting issues about NIDAM’s priorities and perspective 
There is quite a lot of evidence, including from practice observed in BMC, that large and/or 
successful street vendors are advantaged at the expense of smaller vendors. This is a recurring theme 
in India and suggests that the street vendor lobby is somewhat internally contested. Indeed some 
members cannot really be described as ‘urban poor’; the larger or more established vendors would be 
more accurately described as the lower end of the formal retail sector. Furthermore, they are able to 
gain political traction as they are what in Victorian terms might be described as the ‘deserving poor’. 
This author has elsewhere noted the widespread use of categories of deserving and undeserving poor 
in Indian policy-making and in attitudes to the urban poor (Amis 2001). 
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Impact of the Act 
No definitive conclusions can be drawn, given the limited nature of this research. Nevertheless, the 
following seem appropriate observations. First, almost all commentators agreed that the law was an 
improvement on the previous situation and gave some protection to street vendors. In this sense it is a 
reform in the right direction. Secondly, there is a mismatch between the policy on paper (ie listed 
zones) and its implementation on the ground. Thus the red, amber and green zones do not actually 
determine trading. A few caveats are appropriate. First, the policy is still in its early stages and the 
listing of zones could be a first step, to be followed by enforcement. Second, the fieldwork was done 
just before and during national and state elections in 2014; as indicated above, it is very unlikely that 
at such a time any municipality would take steps which might alienate voters.   
In some cases it appears that the red, amber and green zones were almost a proxy for identifying 
prime sites. It is not yet clear whether implementation of the 2014 Act is likely to strengthen or 
weaken the spatial inequalities that flow from the workings of the urban land market. These 
inequalities are important in the public space that street vendors seek to occupy, and the importance of 
public space in the livelihoods of street vendors has been well documented elsewhere (Brown 2006).  
Reflections on the politics of implementation in India 
Some thoughts on Indian policy-making 
At this stage it is appropriate to note some specific aspects of Indian policy-making that will help in 
understanding street vending policy.  
The overarching observation is that India is highly opaque in terms of policy formulation and 
implementation.  Three elements of the policy process are particularly extreme: symbolic policy-
making; legalism; and the problems of implementation. It is crucial to understand these factors, as 
they give Indian policy-making specific characteristics. 
Symbolic policy-making by politicians 
Symbolic policy-making encapsulates the idea that politicians, and to a lesser extent officials, have to 
be seen to do something. To a great extent this is driven by the nature of Indian democracy – the 
electoral turnout of poor or lower income groups is usually higher than that of higher income groups 
(Kohli 2012). Despite the recent resurgence of the ruling BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and its free 
market agenda, welfare and socialist thinking is still widespread. Although there is now a debate 
about the scale of India’s ‘welfare state’, the role of the state is still strongly influenced by the 
interventionism of the 1940s and 1950s. The Government of India, and to a large extent the general 
public, expects a high level of intervention from the state, further complicated by the complexity of 
identity politics in India.  
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At its simplest, while many in the global South expect little from the state, the Indian body politic 
expects a lot. This paper posits that this creates greater pressure on politicians to a) do something and 
b) be seen to do something – mainly popular and/or poverty-alleviating schemes (Dreze and Sen 
2013). Clearly, this situation is likely to lead to symbolic political initiatives. 
Reliance on the legal system to resolve social and political disputes 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the legal system in Indian policy-making. In the world of 
street vending almost all reforms appear to have been driven by court rulings. Many of the reforms, 
guidelines and laws appear to start from the 1985 Bombay Hawkers Union v Bombay Municipal 
Corporation ruling, which outlined a scheme for licensing street vendors. Unfortunately the number 
of street vendors in each location does not appear to have been specified. The result – at least 
according to some sources – was a huge demand for licences. Many subsequent initiatives seem to 
return to this issue: that hawkers’ or vendors’ zones can be declared, but the number of vendors at 
each site remains problematic, which influences how the zone is policed or administered.  
This issue is made more complex by the provisions of the Indian constitution, with some 
responsibilities defined as at union level, some at state level and some at local level. In some cases 
this is helpful, but in other situations it may not be clear where responsibility lies. The NASVI 
example discussed above is a useful snapshot: here, NASVI sought and obtained a special ruling to 
allow national legislation to be made for street vendors, but in other circumstances vending might be 
seen as a state or local function, rather than a national issue. 
More generally, Indian policy often seems to go through a process of legislation being passed and 
then challenged in the courts, often resulting in a ruling that causes an impasse, or the legislation 
being weakened and in some cases effectively disabled. There are some indications that this might 
happen to the 2014 Act on street vendors. It is certainly evident that NASVI put a great deal of trust in 
the power of the legal system, as their efforts, campaigning and enthusiasm for the 2014 law 
demonstrate. 
Much Indian policy-making appears to end up in the legal system, such that the legal system and its 
rulings become a major player in the implementation of policy and in resolving political and legal 
disputes. It then becomes a moot point whether the legal system is effectively implementing policy, or 
stopping policy being implemented.  
A few points are worth making. Firstly, there seems in India to be always a tendency to increase the 
amount of legislation. Secondly, in India, as in most countries, surprisingly few policies are ever 
formally discontinued, which means they often linger in some form. The result is a corpus of often 
 Amis 
 
 Street vendors in India 
 
  
CJLG December 2015 45 
 
conflicting legislation, which increases the significance of court rulings for policy development and 
implementation. It also means that policies are not definitive, as they are open to further legal 
challenge, which increases uncertainty for everyone. 
Problems of implementation 
Implementation has been identified as a potential weak aspect of the policy-making process in many 
countries. In India outcomes are even more uncertain as the detail of policy may be effectively 
determined at local level. There is a well-publicised literature about street-level bureaucrats, and 
Lipsky (1980) for example argues that administrative requirements and regulations are often so 
complex that they are effectively unworkable. The result is that street-level bureaucrats (local 
officials) effectively redesign the original guidelines to simpler versions which they are able to work 
with. This approach is clearly relevant to the Indian context. 
Two points flow from this analysis. First, street vendor policy in India (encapsulated in the 2004 and 
2009 guidelines and the 2014 Act) is an example of how the process of implementation is altered at 
local level. This approach contrasts with a ‘command and control’ model which gives no agency to 
officials actually implementing a policy. In many cases implementation raises issues that cannot be 
predetermined and can only be solved on the ground. Second, the way that policy is changed through 
implementation may or may not be neutral in terms of the original policy objective. 
In this context, a NASVI official’s comments about NASVI’s future role, given that it has achieved its 
campaign objective of passing an enforceable law, was illuminating.  NASVI now plans to focus on 
implementation: “We will be a watchdog … there are loads of legal provisions which are not properly 
implemented [eg the provision that a TVC must have a 40% committee membership representing 
vendors] … the problem is they [the government] will do the street vendor survey but corruption is so 
high in India that [the vendor representatives] will be those who pay them.” NSAVI also noted that it 
would have to watch “how they will define natural markets”. The group evidently feels that all major 
aspects of the 2014 Act will need to be actively monitored in practice. Similar approaches can be 
widely seen in the complex Indian government system, where many actors are quite experienced in 
manipulating processes to their advantage. The identity nature of much of Indian policy and politics is 
relevant here, as such bodies are – compared to many countries – experienced in dealing with this 
complexity and diversity.  
The important questions here are whether corruption of the policy implementation process is 
malevolent or simply incompetent, and whether failure to implement policies represents a systematic 
bias. This study has not gathered sufficient evidence to make a strong statement on this, but this 
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author’s tentative conclusion is that Indian policy-making is often characterised by a tradition of 
progressive legislation being modified often resulting in regressive outcomes.4 
First, there is some evidence of a particularisation of government schemes. It seems that some 
progressive states in India can implement progressive national policies, while others cannot or do not 
(Kohli 2012; Dreze and Sen 2013).  Indeed some states which might be described as ‘neo-
patrimonial’ – including MP – are criticised for a lack of “public purpose” (Kohli 2012, p. 153) 
Second, policy implementation is likely to reflect the prevailing political economy, class and caste 
composition of each state and location. Finally, there is quite extensive academic evidence in India 
that middle-class groups have often been the most successful users of participatory approaches – 
which are designed to empower the poor, but often end up promoting middle-class interests (Shapiro 
Anjaria 2006).  
It is not clear how these processes work, but they are powerful forces capable of redefining 
‘progressive’ legislation, as seen above. The extent to which this power varies by state, political 
economy and administrative capacity is also unknown. 
Lessons on managing the informal sector for local government in the global 
South 
The key lesson of the Indian experience is that a rights-based approach is not sufficient to protect 
poorer citizens and informal economies. Effecting change is not just about providing the appropriate 
legal frameworks (although it should also be noted that, compared to many countries of the global 
South, India has a robust legal system, an active civil society and a free press). The rights-based 
approach goes quite a long way towards strengthening the status of the working poor, but it needs 
political consensus to support and reinforce it. A change in official culture and attitudes towards the 
informal sector is also needed. Clearly legal provisions are an important step in the right direction, but 
they are not the end game. Nevertheless, in trying to design policies for the informal sector, legal 
changes are a very helpful entry point. The Indian example discussed in this paper shows how, despite 
their limitations, they are important in bringing into the mainstream citizens who may previously not 
have been seen as legitimate actors and/or members of society with rights and entitlements. 
 
                                                             
4 I explored this thesis with Odisha officials (IAS) at a policy workshop at Somerville College in Oxford in Jan 
2015. This is one of the states that had most implemented the 2009 guidelines and in some cases was seen as an 
exemplar. Some disagreed with this analysis but a significant group – often in private – did say to me that they 
supported this interpretation of events and policy making. Furthermore some agreed with the result or outcomes 
but admitted they did not understand the process. 
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